Analysis

Fair, According to What?

Fairness often sounds like a conclusion, but it usually hides a choice about priority. After a hurricane, that choice becomes visible: who receives help first, who waits, and which principle governs the sequence.

Daniel R. Neuhaus

Daniel R. Neuhaus

— 23 min read
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Fair, According to What?

After a hurricane, fairness turns on the order of response.[1] The central question is who receives assistance first, who must wait, and which principle governs that sequence.[2]

A citywide power outage imposes immediate and varied burdens. Families with infants need air conditioning. Elderly residents with medical equipment depend on electricity before backup batteries fail. Hospitals require power to sustain lives. Small businesses face further loss if they cannot reopen. The utility, operating with limited crews and damaged infrastructure, must set a restoration sequence before all needs can be addressed.[3] Each decision about which area receives power first contains an underlying judgment about priority.[4]

After Hurricane Beryl, KPRC reported CenterPoint Energy’s response, explaining that its crews first restore facilities “vital to safety, health and welfare,” including hospitals, water treatment plants, and public service facilities; after those facilities, the company said it repairs electrical facilities that return power to the largest number of people first.[5] A 2021 KPRC report described the same basic sequence through a CenterPoint spokesperson: facilities key to community health and welfare first, then lines that restore the greatest number of customers in the least amount of time, then service drops and lines tied to individual homes.[6]

The restoration rule is defensible because it protects essential public infrastructure and directs limited crews to repairs that benefit the greatest number.[7] Yet the same rule can appear unjust to families whose service lines support fewer customers, whose neighborhoods face more complex damage, or whose urgent needs do not fit the sequence.[8] This tension illustrates the broader political problem. A shared problem can still generate conflict when people disagree about which priority should govern.[9]

That is the argument of this piece. Political disputes become more honest when fairness is treated as a claim about priority rather than a self-proving moral conclusion.[10] The question is which priority a position chooses, which authority gives that choice force, and who bears the consequence.[11] This approach holds people accountable for the quality of their judgment, the lawfulness of their actions, and the soundness of their policies.[12] Its purpose is to sharpen disagreement by clarifying priorities and principles before moral accusations are made.[13]

I. The Priority Hidden Inside Fairness

Most people enter politics with a prior sense of fairness, shaped by background, experience, and circumstance.[14] Conflict intensifies when a competing principle is seen as a rejection of fairness itself rather than a different answer to the question of priority.[15]

Recognizing this distinction offers no blanket pardon for every position or outcome; individuals remain accountable for the consequences.[16] Even well-intentioned motives can lead to harm, and the language of fairness can sometimes serve as cover for overreach.[17] Yet this awareness should encourage restraint before we attribute disagreement to character.[18] A more productive inquiry considers which principle is being advanced, under whose authority, at what cost, and with what consequence.[19]

The aim is not to treat every claim of fairness as equally persuasive, but rather to clarify what each claim is actually asserting before passing judgment.[20] Some positions may safeguard a portion of justice while overlooking other important aspects.[21] When priorities are named and examined, debate can shift from accusation to meaningful analysis.[22]

II. Aristotle and the Problem of Partial Justice

Long before the Founders, Aristotle saw this pattern in political life.[23] In Book III of Politics, he explains that oligarchs and democrats each make a claim about justice, and each claim contains a partial truth. Democrats reason from equal freedom to equal political power, while oligarchs reason from unequal wealth to unequal political power.[24] Aristotle’s criticism is that each side takes a limited principle and treats it as the whole of justice.[25]

In Benjamin Jowett’s translation, Aristotle says the parties “agree about the equality of the things, but dispute about the equality of the persons,” chiefly because people are poor judges when their own interests are involved.[26] Stanford’s entry on Aristotle’s political theory states the point in modern terms. Aristotle’s account of distributive justice requires equal persons to receive equal shares and unequal persons to receive unequal shares, while the political fight concerns the standard by which persons count as equal or unequal.[27]

This is the older dilemma resurfacing after the hurricane. Beneath disputes about allocation lies a deeper conflict over which principle should govern distribution.[28] Each side may hold a partial view of justice, and each view can become hazardous if treated as complete.[29]

Aristotle’s warning calls for a more disciplined argument. An opposing view often preserves some aspect of justice rather than rejecting it outright. That aspect may be incomplete or even dangerous if given legal force, but it should be identified before it is criticized.[30] The relevant question is which part of justice a position elevates, and whether that part can bear the weight placed on it.[31]

III. When the Problem Is Shared

The storm example highlights a familiar pattern in political conflict: parties may agree on the existence of a problem, but diverge sharply over how to address it.[32] Debates over fairness are rarely settled by appeals to the word itself. Instead, they hinge on which injury or interest the proposed remedy prioritizes.[33]

Public education offers a clear example. A selective public school has too few seats for the number of qualified students who want to attend.[34] One theory gives the seats to the highest-scoring applicants because achievement should be rewarded.[35] Another uses a lottery among qualified applicants because children should have an equal chance once they clear the threshold.[36] Another gives preference to disadvantaged students from underrepresented schools because opportunities should reach those who have had less of it.[37] Another protects neighborhood access because families made decisions, paid taxes, and built their lives around the local school.[38] The school cannot adopt every theory at once, so the adopted rule must choose whose claim comes first.[39]

Public safety works the same way.[40] In a high-crime neighborhood, one person may say fairness begins with law-abiding residents who want to walk to the store, raise children, and keep businesses open without fear. Another may say fairness begins with citizens who have experienced rough enforcement, failing schools, addiction, joblessness, and disorder for years before police arrive. The first diagnosis points toward order, enforcement, deterrence, and faster response. The second points toward treatment, social repair, and restraint in policing.[41] The conflict may involve motive in some cases, but it often begins with priority: one side has placed victims of disorder at the center, while the other has placed victims of state overreach or social neglect there.[42]

Debt forgiveness produces the same pattern.[43] A borrower says fairness means relief from a burden that can shape decades of life.[44] A non-borrower says fairness means refusing to transfer that burden to people who paid, borrowed less, worked through school, skipped school, or chose a less expensive path.[45] Mercy and cruelty do not describe the dispute with enough precision. The dispute concerns which injury the law should recognize first.[46]

In each example, the problem is recognizable before the remedy is chosen. That is the harder question beneath each example: which claim receives priority when every claim cannot be satisfied at once?[47] That is where political disagreement often begins, and that is where a fair argument should begin, too.[48]

IV. When the Diagnosis Differs

Deeper conflicts emerge when people disagree about the underlying problem itself.[49]

Poverty is the clearest example. If the problem is a lack of opportunity, the remedy will involve schools, transportation, job access, and capital.[50] If the problem is family breakdown, the remedy will involve marriage, fatherhood, local institutions, the church, and cultural expectations.[51] If the problem is weak work incentives, the remedy will involve benefits reform and policies that reward employment.[52] If the problem is crime, order comes first because every other promise depends on safety.[53] If the problem is credential gatekeeping, the remedy will involve licensing reform, vocational paths, and fewer artificial barriers to work.[54]

Debates about remedies often proceed while participants hold different views of causation.[55] This divergence can lead to mutual accusation. One side sees a lack of compassion, the other a lack of judgment. Both perspectives may hold some truth, but each may also mistake a different diagnosis for a moral failing.[56]

This distinction has made politics less contentious for me, though not free of conflict. I try to assume that an opposing view is an attempt to solve a problem through a different theory of fairness. That habit has helped me see more trade-offs and fewer villains. It has made me slower to treat disagreement as evidence of malice. It has also made me more demanding about results, since a charitable view of motive does not make a policy sound.[57]

Mistakes and unintended harm are inevitable in public life: policies sometimes injure those they mean to help, and leaders can invoke compassion as a rationale for control just as easily as they can cite liberty to justify indifference.[58] Programs may unintentionally reward harmful conduct, while rules and regulations can at times punish responsible behavior.[59] Bureaucratic discretion, often expanded by exceptional cases, risks turning every objection into a charge of cruelty.[60] These patterns reveal the limits of good intentions and the need for careful scrutiny of both motive and outcome in the pursuit of fairness.[61]

Charity toward motive should not obscure consequence.[62]

V. Fairness Under Cross-Examination

The word fair often enters political arguments too early and demands agreement before it has earned it.[63] A tax increase may be called fair because wealth can bear a heavier public burden. A tax cut may be called fair because people have a claim to the fruit of their labor. A regulation may be called fair because it protects consumers. Deregulation may be called fair because it reduces favoritism, lowers entry barriers, and limits officials’ power to choose winners.[64] The word does not resolve the debate. It begins the examination.[65]

Fair to whom? Fair according to what principle? Fair against which alternative? Fair under whose authority? Fair at what cost? Fair today, or fair across time?[66] The person who refuses those questions is using a moral conclusion as a substitute for reasoning.[67]

That habit has become especially necessary because Americans increasingly judge political disagreement in moral terms.[68] Pew Research Center reported in March 2026 that the United States was the only country among twenty-five surveyed in which more adults described the morality and ethics of people in their country as bad rather than good: 53% said bad, while 47% said good.[69] Pew also reported that Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents were more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to rate fellow Americans as morally and ethically bad, sixty percent to forty-six percent.[70] A separate Pew report, also published in March 2026, found sharp partisan differences on several moral questions, including homosexuality, pornography, divorce, the death penalty, spanking children, marijuana, abortion, and extreme wealth.[71]

This environment intensifies policy disputes beyond necessity. When disagreement is cast as moral failure, persuasion becomes nearly impossible. Opponents become adversaries to defeat rather than interlocutors to answer. People begin with condemnation rather than asking which principle the other side seeks to protect.[72]

VI. Power Needs a Rule

The fairness problem underscores the importance of institutions. A society divided about fairness requires forms, limits, and procedures to prevent moral certainty from becoming unchecked command.[73]

Publius gave the constitutional version of that argument in Federalist No. 51. The essay argues that government must first control the governed and then oblige itself to control itself, because “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”[74] It also says that justice is the end of government and civil society, pursued until obtained or until liberty is lost in the pursuit.[75] That last phrase is the danger. A politics obsessed with justice can lose liberty while chasing its own version of fairness.[76]

This is where the storm analogy becomes instructive. A utility may prioritize hospitals, then repairs that restore service to the largest number, then individual service problems.[77] While the rule is subject to challenge or revision, its value lies in requiring decisions to follow a clear sequence and in offering the public a transparent framework for scrutiny.[78] By making explicit which principle takes precedence and which is deferred, the process becomes more accountable and intelligible, even as debate about the order persists.[79]

Political power, like utility restoration, requires disciplined processes and transparent justification.[80] Policies gain legitimacy when clearly codified in law, and any exercise of authority must be openly defended and rooted in established rules.[81] This kind of structure makes it possible to evaluate tradeoffs, assign responsibility, and maintain public trust.[82] Where authority exists, the tradeoffs must be identified. If the tradeoff is justified, responsibility must be accepted for those affected.[83] This process is slower than slogans, but it is more accountable than moral urgency backed by vague discretion.[84]

The more contested the fairness principle, the greater the need for lawful authority, clear rules, local variation, public accountability, and skepticism toward administrative power.[85] That is a conservative instinct worth preserving.[86] It does not deny that the government has work to do. It insists that the government act through legitimate means, with attention to incentives, tradeoffs, and human self-interest.[87]

Individuals most convinced of their own fairness are often those most in need of external constraints.[88]

VII. A More Exact Argument

Politics will always involve conflict because fairness takes many forms.[89] Equality, need, merit, efficiency, order, liberty, responsibility, and mercy cannot all govern the same decision.[90] A free people will argue about which principle should control, especially when resources are scarce and consequences are immediate.[91]

While absolute harmony may be an appealing ideal, in politics it often comes at the expense of dissent and open debate.[92] The more valuable pursuit is a process that clarifies competing principles and sharpens disagreement, allowing arguments to unfold with precision rather than being stifled by calls for superficial peace.[93]

Evaluating political arguments demands thoughtful scrutiny rather than quick agreement or reflexive skepticism.[94] Each proposal should be examined for the problem it aims to address, the fairness principle it invokes, and the evidence supporting claims of good or bad faith.[95] Remedies, elegant or otherwise, require careful consideration of who bears the costs and benefits, the structures of decision-making they entail, and the powers they establish.[96] By shifting the debate toward substance and responsibility, we clarify what is at stake in every appeal to fairness.[97]

That habit has made politics less corrosive for me. It has helped me listen for the underlying principle before responding to policy. It has helped me distinguish between motive and remedy, and between remedy and consequence. It has made me cautious of any politics that treats its own definition of fairness as self-evident.[98]

In a free society, fairness will be strained.[99] The task is to identify those divisions honestly, argue from principle, evaluate remedies by their consequences, and impose necessary constraints on resulting power.[100] The opposing party may still be mistaken, even dangerously so, but the initial inquiry should be more precise than an accusation.[101]

  1. See Jon Lamont & Christi Favor, Distributive Justice, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ (last visited May 24, 2026) (explaining that principles of distributive justice provide moral guidance for political processes and structures that distribute benefits and burdens); Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three.html (last visited May 24, 2026) (framing political justice around equality and the question whether equality or inequality should control and in what respect). ↩︎

  2. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (describing distributive-justice principles as principles governing the allocation of benefits and burdens); Fred D. Miller, Jr., Aristotle’s Political Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ (last visited May 24, 2026) (explaining that Aristotle treats constitutional arguments as applications of distributive justice). ↩︎

  3. See CDC Office of Readiness and Response, Power Sources, https://www.cdc.gov/prepare-your-health/take-action/power-sources.html (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that power outages caused by large-scale disasters can last longer and can be life-threatening for people who depend on home-use medical devices); EPA, Extreme Heat and Indoor Air Quality, https://www.epa.gov/emergencies-iaq/extreme-heat-and-indoor-air-quality (last visited May 24, 2026) (explaining that power outages can render cooling systems unusable and that rising indoor temperatures can cause heat exhaustion or heat stroke); National Weather Service, Heat Safety Tips and Resources, https://www.weather.gov/safety/heat (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that infants and young children are particularly vulnerable to heat-related illness and death because their bodies are less able to adapt to heat than adults’ bodies); CenterPoint Energy, How We Are Supporting Critical Care Customers, https://www.centerpointenergy.com/en-us/residential/customer-service/critical-care-customers?sa=HO (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that registered critical-care customers depend on electric-powered life-sustaining equipment); Insurance Information Institute, When Disaster Strikes: Preparation, Response and Recovery for Your Business, https://www.iii.org/article/when-disaster-strikes-preparation-response-and-recovery (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that businesses temporarily shut down or close forever after disasters and citing FEMA for the proposition that 40% of companies do not reopen after a disaster and another 25% fail within one year); U.S. Small Business Administration, Disaster Assistance, https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/disaster-assistance (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that SBA disaster loans may cover business operating expenses that could have been met had the disaster not occurred). ↩︎

  4. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (explaining that distributive-justice principles guide the distribution of benefits and burdens); Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1 (asking whether equality or inequality should control and in what respect). ↩︎

  5. Deven Clarke, Third Ward Neighbors Band Together Amid Ongoing Power Outages Caused by Hurricane Beryl, KPRC 2 Click2Houston (July 10, 2024), https://www.click2houston.com/news/local/2024/07/10/third-ward-neighbors-band-together-amid-ongoing-power-outages-caused-by-hurricane-beryl/ (quoting CenterPoint’s 10:09 p.m. response that crews first restore facilities “vital to safety, health and welfare,” including hospitals, water-treatment plants, and public-service facilities, and then repair electrical facilities that return power to the largest number of people first). ↩︎

  6. Michael Lopardi, Here Is How Local Officials Prioritize Who Gets Their Power Restored After Storm, KPRC 2 Click2Houston (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.click2houston.com/news/local/2021/02/13/here-is-how-local-officials-prioritize-who-gets-their-power-restored-after-storm/ (quoting CenterPoint spokesperson Olivia Koch that crews restore facilities key to community health and welfare first, then lines restoring the greatest number of customers in the least amount of time, and finally service drops and underground lines linked to individual homes). ↩︎

  7. See Clarke, supra note 5; Lopardi, supra note 6. ↩︎

  8. See Lopardi, supra note 6 (describing individualized service drops and underground lines as later-stage restoration work); CenterPoint Energy, Power Restoration and Safety Information, https://www.centerpointenergy.com/en-us/Safety/Pages/power-restoration_safety-information.aspx?au=res&sa=ho (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that CenterPoint repairs the electric-delivery system up to the point where it connects to a home or business, while customer-side meter-box or weatherhead damage is the customer’s responsibility). ↩︎

  9. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (surveying competing principles of distributive justice); Aristotle, Politics bk. V, ch. 1, https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.5.five.html (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that factions agree justice is proportional but disagree over whether equality or inequality in one respect should control absolutely); James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, Yale Law School Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp (last visited May 24, 2026) (arguing that different opinions and interests arise from human reason, self-love, and unequal property, and that regulating “various and interfering interests” is a principal task of legislation). ↩︎

  10. See Stefan Gosepath, Equality, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/ (last visited May 24, 2026) (describing equality as a contested concept with rhetorical power in political argument and explaining that equality requires specification of the relevant standard of comparison); Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (surveying competing principles for distributing benefits and burdens). ↩︎

  11. See Madison, supra note 9 (describing legislation as the regulation of various and interfering interests); Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (explaining that principles of distributive justice guide allocation of benefits and burdens). ↩︎

  12. See The Federalist No. 51, Yale Law School Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp (last visited May 24, 2026) (arguing that government must be structured so that it controls the governed and then obliges itself to control itself). ↩︎

  13. See Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek, Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations, 96 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 1029, 1029–30 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141 (finding differences in how liberals and conservatives use moral foundations and describing ideological commitments as moral commitments); Pew Research Center, In 25-Country Survey, Americans Especially Likely To View Fellow Citizens as Morally Bad (Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2026/03/05/in-25-country-survey-americans-especially-likely-to-view-fellow-citizens-as-morally-bad/ (reporting that Americans are unusually likely to rate fellow citizens as morally bad). ↩︎

  14. See Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 13 (finding differences in moral foundations across liberal and conservative respondents); Gosepath, supra note 10 (explaining that equality is contested and that different standards yield different conceptions). ↩︎

  15. See Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 13; Pew Research Center, supra note 13. ↩︎

  16. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (distinguishing principles of distributive justice without treating all principles as equally correct); Madison, supra note 9 (warning that parties and factions may be actuated by passion or interest adverse to rights or the community’s permanent interests). ↩︎

  17. See Peter G. Peterson Foundation, What Are the Pros and Cons of Student Loan Forgiveness?, https://www.pgpf.org/article/what-are-the-pros-and-cons-of-student-loan-forgiveness/ (last visited May 24, 2026) (explaining that student-debt cancellation could help many borrowers while also carrying fiscal costs, distributional concerns, and limited effects on economic output); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723–24 (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf (requiring clear congressional authorization when an agency asserts power of vast economic and political significance). ↩︎

  18. See Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 13; Jack Blumenau & Benjamin E. Lauderdale, Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Very Similar Sets of Foundations When Comparing Moral Violations, 119 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 746, 746–47 (2025), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000492 (arguing that voters on the left and right share broadly similar moral intuitions when comparing moral violations). ↩︎

  19. See Madison, supra note 9; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  20. See Gosepath, supra note 10 (explaining that equality requires a relevant standard of comparison and that different conceptions of equality arise from different standards); Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (surveying competing distributive principles). ↩︎

  21. See Aristotle, Politics bk. V, ch. 1, supra note 9 (stating that democrats and oligarchs err by treating equality or inequality in one respect as absolute); Miller, supra note 2 (explaining Aristotle’s treatment of constitutional arguments as applications of distributive justice). ↩︎

  22. See Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  23. See Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1; Miller, supra note 2. ↩︎

  24. See Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1 (describing democratic and oligarchic claims about equality and political justice); Miller, supra note 2 (discussing Aristotle’s analysis of democratic and oligarchic claims as applications of distributive justice). ↩︎

  25. See Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1 (stating that the parties “only express a sort of justice” and speak from “a limited and partial justice” while treating their claims as complete); see also Aristotle, Politics bk. V, ch. 1, supra note 9 (describing error when equality or inequality in one respect is treated as equality or inequality absolutely). ↩︎

  26. Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  27. See Miller, supra note 2 (stating that Aristotle’s particular justice means equality or fairness and includes distributive justice); Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  28. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  29. See Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1; Aristotle, Politics bk. V, ch. 1, supra note 9. ↩︎

  30. See Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  31. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  32. See Madison, supra note 9 (describing politics as involving “various and interfering interests”); Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  33. See Gosepath, supra note 10; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  34. See NYC Public Schools, Specialized High Schools, https://www.schools.nyc.gov/enrollment/enroll-grade-by-grade/specialized-high-schools (last visited May 24, 2026) (describing selective public high-school admissions for eight testing Specialized High Schools using the Specialized High Schools Admissions Test). ↩︎

  35. See id. (stating that students with the highest SHSAT scores receive offers first and that the SHSAT is the only criterion used to admit students to the eight testing Specialized High Schools). ↩︎

  36. See Houston Independent School District, K-12 Application Dates & Process, https://schoolchoice.houstonisd.org/k-12-application/k-12-application2 (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that all eligible Phase I applications are entered into a lottery to determine seat placements and that eligible students not offered a seat are automatically placed on a waitlist). ↩︎

  37. See NYC Public Schools, Discovery Programs, https://www.schools.nyc.gov/enrollment/enroll-grade-by-grade/specialized-high-schools/discovery-programs (last visited May 24, 2026) (describing the Discovery Program as serving certain disadvantaged students who scored within a certain range on the SHSAT and may attend a testing Specialized High School after completing a summer program). The sentence uses the broader phrase “students from weaker schools” as an illustrative fairness theory; the cited program supports a narrower admissions example involving disadvantaged students and school-based eligibility. ↩︎

  38. See Adam Goldstein & Orestes P. Hastings, School Quality Influences Where Parents Choose to Live—and How Much They’re Willing to Pay for Their Homes, Urban Institute Housing Matters (Jan. 8, 2020), https://archive-housingmatters.urban.org/research-summary/school-quality-influences-where-parents-choose-live-and-how-much-theyre-willing/ (summarizing research finding that where a family lives commonly designates where a child attends school, school quality and housing price are linked, and families with children take on greater housing-cost increases for the same improvement in school quality); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (recognizing local control over schools as a longstanding educational tradition); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973) (discussing local taxation and control in public education). ↩︎

  39. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  40. See National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities 1–4 (2018), https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/24928/proactive-policing-effects-on-crime-and-communities (last visited May 24, 2026) (examining policing strategies intended to prevent and reduce crime and their effects on communities); Urban Institute, The National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice: Key Process and Outcome Evaluation Findings 1 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/National_Initiative_Building_Community_Trust_Key_Findings.pdf (stating that communities experiencing high levels of crime and concentrated disadvantage, particularly communities of color, also distrust police and are less likely to report crimes or partner on crime-prevention efforts). ↩︎

  41. See National Academies, supra note 40; Urban Institute, supra note 40. ↩︎

  42. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; National Academies, supra note 40; Urban Institute, supra note 40. ↩︎

  43. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 490–95, 506 (2023), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf (describing the Biden Administration’s student-loan-discharge program and holding that the HEROES Act did not authorize the Secretary’s debt-cancellation plan); Peter G. Peterson Foundation, supra note 17 (summarizing arguments for and against student-loan forgiveness). ↩︎

  44. See Adam Looney, The Student Debt Burden and Its Impact on Racial Justice, Borrowers, and the Economy, Brookings (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-student-debt-burden-and-its-impact-on-racial-justice-borrowers-and-the-economy/ (testifying that federal student loans impose heavy burdens on many borrowers, especially those from lower-income families, first-generation students, and students of color); Peter G. Peterson Foundation, supra note 17 (describing proponents’ view that debt relief could improve borrowers’ financial health). ↩︎

  45. See Peter G. Peterson Foundation, supra note 17 (explaining objections that student-debt forgiveness would be costly, could provide outsized benefits to high-income households, and would not address the drivers of student debt); Biden, 600 U.S. at 490–95 (describing the scale of the cancellation program and the legal challenge to executive authority). ↩︎

  46. See Biden, 600 U.S. at 490–95, 506; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  47. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  48. See Gosepath, supra note 10; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  49. See AEI/Brookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity, Opportunity, Responsibility, and Security: A Consensus Plan for Reducing Poverty and Restoring the American Dream 5–10 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/full-report.pdf (describing poverty, opportunity, family, work, and education as intertwined policy concerns and explaining that political disagreement often arises when proposed solutions rest on different premises); Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  50. See AEI/Brookings Working Group, supra note 49, at 5–10, 54–69 (framing poverty policy around opportunity, work, family, and education); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Barriers Within Low- and Moderate-Income Communities, Monthly Labor Review (Mar. 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/beyond-bls/employment-barriers-within-low-and-moderate-income-communities.htm (summarizing research identifying job availability and pay, qualifications, education and training, transportation, childcare and family issues, crime and substance abuse, housing instability, health, and public-assistance programs as employment barriers in low- and moderate-income communities). ↩︎

  51. See AEI/Brookings Working Group, supra note 49, at 30–41 (chapter on family); Ron Haskins, Fighting Poverty Through Incentives and Work Mandates for Young Men, Brookings (Sept. 1, 2007), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/fighting-poverty-through-incentives-and-work-mandates-for-young-men/ (discussing family, schools, churches, peer groups, and civic associations in relation to young men and poverty). ↩︎

  52. See Haskins, supra note 51 (examining wage subsidies and work requirements as policies intended to increase employment and earnings and reduce crime, unemployment, nonmarital births, and poverty); AEI/Brookings Working Group, supra note 49, at 42–53 (chapter on work). ↩︎

  53. See National Academies, supra note 40; Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  54. See U.S. Department of Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers & U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Policymakers 4 (July 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf (stating that licensing can reduce employment opportunities, lower wages for excluded workers, and increase costs for consumers); Federal Trade Commission, Economic Liberty, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy-research/advocacy/economic-liberty (last visited May 24, 2026) (stating that unnecessary licensing restrictions can close the door on job opportunities, prevent workers from marketing their skills, reduce entrepreneurship, and stifle competition). ↩︎

  55. See AEI/Brookings Working Group, supra note 49; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 13. ↩︎

  56. See Pew Research Center, supra note 13; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 13; Blumenau & Lauderdale, supra note 18. ↩︎

  57. See Peter G. Peterson Foundation, supra note 17; Looney, supra note 44. These sources support the proposition that a policy can be defended by humane goals while remaining subject to cost, distributional, and consequence-based critique. ↩︎

  58. See Peter G. Peterson Foundation, supra note 17; West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24; Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  59. See U.S. Department of Treasury et al., supra note 54; Haskins, supra note 51. ↩︎

  60. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24. This citation supports the concern about discretion and broad agency power, not the rhetorical phrase “charge of cruelty.” ↩︎

  61. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Peter G. Peterson Foundation, supra note 17; West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24. ↩︎

  62. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Peter G. Peterson Foundation, supra note 17. ↩︎

  63. See Gosepath, supra note 10 (describing equality as contested and rhetorically powerful); Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  64. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (discussing distributive principles including welfare, equality, desert, and liberty); Gosepath, supra note 10 (discussing equality as a prescriptive political concept requiring a standard of comparison); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (declaring unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices unlawful); National Archives, Interstate Commerce Act (1887), https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/interstate-commerce-act (last visited May 24, 2026) (describing early federal regulation aimed at railroad rates and discriminatory practices); U.S. Department of Treasury et al., supra note 54; Federal Trade Commission, supra note 54. ↩︎

  65. See Gosepath, supra note 10; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  66. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Madison, supra note 9; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  67. See Gosepath, supra note 10; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  68. See Pew Research Center, supra note 13; Pew Research Center, What Do Americans Consider Immoral? (Mar. 19, 2026), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2026/03/19/what-do-americans-consider-immoral/. ↩︎

  69. Pew Research Center, supra note 13. ↩︎

  70. Id. ↩︎

  71. Pew Research Center, What Do Americans Consider Immoral?, supra note 68; Pew Research Center, Appendix: Detailed Tables, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2026/03/19/appendix-detailed-tables-us-morality/ (last visited May 24, 2026) (listing morality responses for pornography, marijuana, divorce, homosexuality, the death penalty, spanking children, abortion, and being extremely rich). ↩︎

  72. See Pew Research Center, supra note 13; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 13; Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  73. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  74. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  75. Id. ↩︎

  76. See id. ↩︎

  77. See Clarke, supra note 5; Lopardi, supra note 6. ↩︎

  78. See Lopardi, supra note 6; CenterPoint Energy, Power Restoration and Safety Information, supra note 8. ↩︎

  79. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  80. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24. ↩︎

  81. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. ↩︎

  82. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  83. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  84. See West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  85. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; Madison, supra note 9; West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24. ↩︎

  86. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  87. See id.; Madison, supra note 9; U.S. Department of Treasury et al., supra note 54. ↩︎

  88. See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12 (arguing that government requires internal controls because those administering power are human); Madison, supra note 9 (warning that no man should be judge in his own cause because interest biases judgment). ↩︎

  89. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; Gosepath, supra note 10. ↩︎

  90. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1 (surveying distributive theories including equality, priority to the least advantaged, desert, welfare, and liberty); Aristotle, Politics bk. V, ch. 1, supra note 9. ↩︎

  91. See Madison, supra note 9; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  92. See Madison, supra note 9 (stating that liberty is to faction what air is to fire and that abolishing liberty to remove faction would be worse than the disease). ↩︎

  93. See id.; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  94. See Gosepath, supra note 10; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  95. See Madison, supra note 9; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12. ↩︎

  96. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24. ↩︎

  97. See Gosepath, supra note 10; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

  98. See Gosepath, supra note 10; Lamont & Favor, supra note 1. ↩︎

  99. See Madison, supra note 9. ↩︎

  100. See Lamont & Favor, supra note 1; The Federalist No. 51, supra note 12; West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723–24. ↩︎

  101. See Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 13; Blumenau & Lauderdale, supra note 18; Aristotle, Politics bk. III, ch. 9, supra note 1. ↩︎

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