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# America Should Help Britain Keep Diego Garcia
- URL: https://www.thecommonplace.press/america-should-help-britain-keep-diego-garcia/
- Published: 2026-10-29T20:00:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-03T21:03:47.000Z
- Description: Britain should keep Diego Garcia, and America should help finance an agreement with Mauritius that preserves British sovereignty and secures enforceable rights for displaced Chagossians.
- Author: Daniel R. Neuhaus
- Tags: Articles, Analysis, Explainers, Outlook

Britain has signed an agreement to give up sovereignty over Diego Garcia and pay to keep its military base there for ninety-nine years.[\[1\]](#fn1) The United States should put its money and diplomatic weight behind a better bargain, one that keeps the island under allied sovereignty for as long as the two countries need it.

The treaty remains unratified, and the British government confirmed on October 27 that discussions with America and Mauritius continue.[\[2\]](#fn2) Washington still has an opportunity to secure permanent allied control of a position on which its own military relies.

Diego Garcia sits in the central Indian Ocean, with an airfield and harbor that help American forces operate across the Middle East, East Africa, and South Asia.[\[3\]](#fn3) In August 2020, three B-2 stealth bombers flew twenty-nine hours from Missouri to deploy there.[\[4\]](#fn4) The program’s 1999 acquisition estimate, including development, averaged roughly $2.1 billion per aircraft.[\[5\]](#fn5) Their reach is extraordinary, and keeping them supplied and operating far from home requires places like Diego Garcia.

Ships carrying equipment and supplies for the Army and Marine Corps have operated from Diego Garcia.[\[6\]](#fn6) Troops can fly to a region and meet equipment already nearby, saving the time otherwise spent moving heavy cargo across an ocean.[\[7\]](#fn7) A base like this lets a president respond with forces that can arrive and remain useful. That is part of the responsibility America assumes when it promises to help defend countries far from its own shores.

Replacing Diego Garcia would mean finding another location with comparable reach, suitable air and maritime facilities, and reliable permission to use them. Britain’s own announcement of the treaty describes the base as having irreplaceable security capabilities.[\[8\]](#fn8) Britain should be bargaining to retain sovereignty over an installation its own government calls irreplaceable, with American money behind that demand.

The difficulty is that Britain acquired this position through conduct that deserves condemnation. The Chagos Islands had been administered with Mauritius under British rule, and families had lived there for generations when American planners arrived.[\[9\]](#fn9) In 1964, the Americans told their British counterparts that they wanted exclusive control, preferably without employing local inhabitants. Britain would acquire the land, move the population, and pay compensation.[\[10\]](#fn10)

Mauritian ministers proposed a ninety-nine-year lease in 1965, an arrangement British officials said the United States opposed. The allies wanted the authority to remain without having to obtain the continuing agreement of an independent Mauritius, so Britain detached Chagos before granting Mauritius independence in 1968.[\[11\]](#fn11)

The pressure behind that decision survives in the government’s own papers. Before Prime Minister Harold Wilson met Mauritian premier Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam in September 1965, Wilson’s private secretary wrote, “The object is to frighten him with hope.” Independence was the hope, and continued dependence was the threat. Britain obtained agreement from representatives whose country’s freedom still depended on the government demanding it.[\[12\]](#fn12)

The treatment of the islanders was worse. A Foreign Office lawyer, A. I. Aust, advised in 1970 that an immigration ordinance would help “maintain the fiction” that the inhabitants were not a permanent or semipermanent population.[\[13\]](#fn13) Families who had made their lives there were an inconvenience to be explained away. Britain completed their removal by 1973, after islanders were told that the plantations were closing and supplies would cease.[\[14\]](#fn14)

The governments wanted the territory and used their power over the people to obtain it. Further compensation and a funded opportunity to return wherever military security permits should be part of the price Britain and America pay for retaining control. The islanders should help negotiate those terms and receive rights they can enforce in court.

Handing sovereignty to Mauritius would leave some of that injustice unresolved. The 2025 treaty gives Mauritius discretion to resettle the outer islands while excluding Diego Garcia from that provision, leaving displaced families without an enforceable promise of return.[\[15\]](#fn15) A government can acquire sovereignty while the people who lost their homes continue waiting, which is why a change of flag alone is an inadequate answer to their claim.

In 2019, the International Court of Justice concluded that detaching Chagos had violated the right to self-determination and that British administration should end as rapidly as possible.[\[16\]](#fn16) The opinion was advisory, yet another international tribunal subsequently treated Mauritius as the coastal state for the islands.[\[17\]](#fn17) Britain needs an agreement that resolves the sovereignty dispute if it wants a more secure basis for staying.

The strongest case for the treaty is that ninety-nine years of agreed access could prove safer than possession under a disputed claim. The treaty grants extensive powers to operate the base, letting Britain continue to authorize American use and control military operations. Mauritius would receive notice of armed attacks launched from the base against another state, without a general power to approve them.[\[18\]](#fn18)

The weakness comes when the term expires, because the forty-year extension requires agreement, as do extensions after it. A right of first refusal would let Britain match terms offered to another party, without guaranteeing continued occupation.[\[19\]](#fn19) If the allies still needed the base, the cost of moving would give Mauritius considerable bargaining power. Britain would have spent the intervening decades maintaining an installation whose future use it then had to negotiate.

A century understandably sounds like plenty of time to a government with an election ahead of it, while military geography demands a longer view. The island chosen in the 1960s remains useful through changes in governments, aircraft, and adversaries, and the ocean around it will remain just as wide when this agreement expires. We should seek terms that let future governments keep the base for as long as they need it, without scheduling a new negotiation over whether they may remain.

Britain retained sovereignty over its bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia under the treaty establishing independent Cyprus.[\[20\]](#fn20) An agreement for Diego Garcia would require Mauritius’s consent and respect for the affected people’s self-determination. London and Washington should pursue it with a serious financial offer, settling the claim to Diego Garcia while addressing the rest of Chagos separately.

Mauritius says sovereignty over the entire archipelago is non-negotiable,[\[21\]](#fn21) and changing that position will require more than telling its government how much Americans value the base. Washington should help finance compensation and continuing economic benefits large enough to make an agreement worth considering. A president who insists on keeping Diego Garcia should be prepared to ask Congress for the money to help secure it.

The offer will have a cost, and its value should be judged against the expense and military disadvantages of finding a replacement. Direct American acquisition by agreement should remain an option if it offers a better route to permanent allied control.[\[22\]](#fn22) British sovereignty also needs to be accompanied by renewed American operating rights, because the separate agreement governing American use runs only until December 30, 2036.[\[23\]](#fn23)

Keeping the base also means taking responsibility for the sea around it. Research has found generally low pollution levels with localized problems,[\[24\]](#fn24) which calls for independent monitoring and repair of damage caused by military operations. Britain and America should accept those costs as part of the expense of operating the installation.

Washington should put a funded offer for a sovereign base before Mauritius and make that the object of renewed negotiations. Britain should keep Diego Garcia, and America should accept the expense and responsibility that come with keeping it.

---

1. [Agreement Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Including Diego Garcia](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/682f25afc054883884bff42a/CS%5FMauritius%5F1.2025%5FAgreement%5FChagos%5FDiego%5FGarcia.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), Mauritius–U.K., arts. 1–2, 11(1), 13(1), May 22, 2025, CP 1334 \[hereinafter Chagos Agreement\]. [↩︎](#fnref1)
2. Patrick Butchard, House of Commons Library, CBP-10512, [*International Law and the Chagos Archipelago*](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10512/CBP-10512.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press) 4–6 (2026); Uma Kumaran, [Written Answer to Question 901737](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-10-21/901737?ref=thecommonplace.press) (Oct. 27, 2026) (U.K.). [↩︎](#fnref2)
3. Ministry of Defence & Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, [*UK Secures Future of Vital Diego Garcia Military Base to Protect National Security*](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-secures-future-of-vital-diego-garcia-military-base-to-protect-national-security?ref=thecommonplace.press), under “Diego Garcia capabilities” and “Strategic and operational importance” (May 22, 2025) \[hereinafter Ministry of Defence Announcement\]. [↩︎](#fnref3)
4. Hailey Haux, [*B2 Spirit Stealth Bombers Deploy to Diego Garcia in Support of Bomber Task Force*](https://www.dvidshub.net/news/375800/b2-spirit-stealth-bombers-deploy-diego-garcia-support-bomber-task-force?ref=thecommonplace.press), Def. Visual Info. Distribution Serv. (Aug. 12, 2020). [↩︎](#fnref4)
5. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., GAO/NSIAD-99-97, [*Defense Acquisitions: Achieving B-2A Bomber Operational Requirements*](https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-99-97.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press) 1–2 (1999). The figure divides the reported $44.5 billion acquisition-program estimate by twenty-one aircraft. It includes development and other program costs. [↩︎](#fnref5)
6. Grady Fontana, [*Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron Two Changes Leadership*](https://www.dvidshub.net/news/474965/maritime-prepositioning-ships-squadron-two-changes-leadership?ref=thecommonplace.press), Def. Visual Info. Distribution Serv. (June 27, 2024). [↩︎](#fnref6)
7. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-05-427, [*Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future Programs*](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-05-427.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press) 7 (2005). [↩︎](#fnref7)
8. Ministry of Defence Announcement, *supra* note 3, under “Diego Garcia capabilities.” [↩︎](#fnref8)
9. [*R (Bancoult) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affs. (No. 2)*](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd081022/banc.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), \[2008\] UKHL 61, \[4\]–\[5\], \[2009\] 1 A.C. 453 (appeal taken from Eng.). [↩︎](#fnref9)
10. [Memorandum from Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State for Politico-Military Affs., to Dean Rusk, Sec’y of State](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d34?ref=thecommonplace.press) (Mar. 3, 1964), in 21 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968: Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, doc. 34, ¶ 2(c)–(d) (Nina Davis Howland ed., 2000). [↩︎](#fnref10)
11. [*Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. U.K.)*](https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol%5FXXXI/359-606.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), 31 R.I.A.A. 359, ¶¶ 68, 70–72, 81, 421(a) (UNCLOS Annex VII Arb. Trib. 2015). [↩︎](#fnref11)
12. [*Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965*](https://icj-web.leman.un-icc.cloud/sites/default/files/case-related/169/169-20190225-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. 95, 122–23, ¶¶ 105–08 (Feb. 25). Wright’s note was dated September 22, 1965; Wilson met Ramgoolam the following morning. [↩︎](#fnref12)
13. [*R (Bancoult) v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affs. (No. 1)*](https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000033/000000/000009/unrestricted/calvinscase/calvin01.html?ref=thecommonplace.press), \[2000\] EWHC 413 (Admin), \[16\]–\[18\], \[2001\] Q.B. 1067 (Eng.) (reproducing Aust’s January 16, 1970 advice). [↩︎](#fnref13)
14. [*Bancoult (No. 2)*](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd081022/banc.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), \[2008\] UKHL 61, \[8\]–\[10\]. For earlier compensation and settlements, *see id.* \[11\]–\[13\]. [↩︎](#fnref14)
15. Chagos Agreement, *supra* note 1, art. 6; Int’l Agreements Comm., [*UK–Mauritius Agreement on the Chagos Archipelago Including Diego Garcia*](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5901/ldselect/ldintagr/146/146.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), 9th Report, 2024–26, HL 146, ¶¶ 41, 46 (U.K.). [↩︎](#fnref15)
16. [*Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965*](https://icj-web.leman.un-icc.cloud/sites/default/files/case-related/169/169-20190225-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), 2019 I.C.J. at 137–39, ¶¶ 172–78\. [↩︎](#fnref16)
17. [*Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives)*](https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/28/published/C28%5FPO%5FJudgment%5F20210128.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2020–2021 ITLOS Rep. 17, 89, ¶¶ 249–51 (Jan. 28, 2021) (treating Mauritius as the coastal state for maritime-boundary delimitation). [↩︎](#fnref17)
18. Chagos Agreement, *supra* note 1, arts. 2(2), 2(5), 3(2), annex 1, ¶¶ 1(a), 1(b)(i), 2; Int’l Agreements Comm., *supra* note 15, ¶¶ 23, 32–33\. [↩︎](#fnref18)
19. Chagos Agreement, *supra* note 1, art. 13(2)–(5). The right of first refusal lasts forty years after the initial term and must be exercised within six months after notification of the offered terms. *Id.* art. 13(5). [↩︎](#fnref19)
20. [Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20382/v382.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), art. 1, Aug. 16, 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 8\. [↩︎](#fnref20)
21. Gov’t Info. Serv., Republic of Mauritius, [*PM Reaffirms Chagos Sovereignty in London*](https://gis.govmu.org/gis/?id=2610&page%5Fid=4008&ref=thecommonplace.press) (Oct. 14, 2026) (reporting the prime minister’s October 2 meeting with Britain’s national security adviser). [↩︎](#fnref21)
22. *See* [*Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter*](https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep026/usrep026511/usrep026511.pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (recognizing federal power to acquire territory by treaty). [↩︎](#fnref22)
23. Sir Alan Duncan, Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [*Update on the British Indian Ocean Territory*](https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2016-11-16/HCWS260?ref=thecommonplace.press), Written Statement HCWS260 (Nov. 16, 2016) (U.K.). [↩︎](#fnref23)
24. Suzanne J. Painting et al., [*Marine Water Quality at Diego Garcia: A Preliminary Study of Pollution Levels in Coastal and Lagoon Waters*](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/marine-science/articles/10.3389/fmars.2021.671319/pdf?ref=thecommonplace.press), 8 Frontiers Marine Sci., July 21, 2021, art. 671319, at 1, 4, 17 (reporting findings from sampling conducted March 26–April 2, 2019). [↩︎](#fnref24)